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Abstract
Although the processes that underlie sharing others’ emotions (empathy) and understanding others’ mental states
(mentalizing, Theory of Mind) have received increasing attention, it is yet unclear how they relate to each other. For
instance, are people who strongly empathize with others also more proficient in mentalizing? And (how) do the neural
networks supporting empathy and mentalizing interact? Assessing both functions simultaneously in a large sample
(N¼178), we show that people’s capacities to empathize and mentalize are independent, both on a behavioral and neural
level. Thus, strong empathizers are not necessarily proficient mentalizers, arguing against a general capacity of social
understanding. Second, we applied dynamic causal modeling to investigate how the neural networks underlying empathy
and mentalizing are orchestrated in naturalistic social settings. Results reveal that in highly emotional situations, empathic
sharing can inhibit mentalizing-related activity and thereby harm mentalizing performance. Taken together, our findings
speak against a unitary construct of social understanding and suggest flexible interplay of distinct social functions.
Key words: social cognition; empathy; theory of mind; mentalizing; fMRI; dynamic causal modeling.
Introduction
Picture yourself in a conversation with your brother who just
told you how his beloved decided that she ‘wants to stay
friends’. In order to act appropriately, to give adequate advice
and support, you need to quickly grasp both what your brother’s
ex girl-friend actually means when she talks about staying
friends and the emotional state your brother is in. This example
illustrates that successful social interaction relies on our ability
to share others’ emotions (empathy) and comprehend their
thoughts and intentions [mentalizing, Theory of Mind (ToM)]
(Frith and Frith, 2005; Singer, 2012; Kanske et al., 2015a). These
two routes of social understanding have been associated with
distinct neural networks. Meta-analyses yielded a core network
including anterior insula (AI), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and an-
terior cingulate cortex (ACC) for empathy for pain (Lamm et al.,
2011). When a broader range of empathy paradigms are consid-
ered, a more extensive neural network was identified, including
AI, IFG and ACC but also more dorsal regions of the dorsolateral
and medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC and dlPFC), and anterior/
dorsal parts of the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) including
supramarginal gyrus (SMG; Bzdok et al., 2012). ToM involves a
distinct network including posterior/ventral TPJ, temporal
poles, superior temporal sulcus, medial prefrontal cortex and
precuneus [(Schurz et al., 2014); direct tests of the dissociation
confirm the distinction of empathy and ToM networks on the
level of brain function (Kanske et al., 2015b) and structure (Eres
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et al., 2015; Valk et al., 2016)]. As the literature varies in the defin-
ition of the concepts empathy and ToM (Schurz and Perner,
2015), we want to clarify that we define empathy as an emo-
tional state that is isomorphic to and elicited by observing or
imagining another’s affective state (de Vignemont and Singer,
2006). Hence, empathy can be described as ‘feeling with’ rather
than ‘feeling for’ another, the latter referring to empathic con-
cern and compassion (Batson et al., 1987). For instance, when
confronted with others’ suffering, empathy would refer to shar-
ing the suffering and hence be associated to negative affect,
whereas compassion would include feelings of warmth, loving-
kindness and concern and a strong motivation to alleviate the
others’ suffering (Singer and Klimecki, 2014). ToM, in contrast,
refers to cognitively representing and reasoning on others’
mental (or affective) states (Premack and Woodruff 1978; Frith
and Frith, 2005). The key difference between empathy and ToM
is that the former entails embodied sharing of a sensory, affect-
ive or bodily state while the latter yields propositional know-
ledge of another’s state. Though previous studies have
compared cognitive and affective aspects of ToM (i.e. mentaliz-
ing on others’ cognitive, perceptual or affective states; Vollm
et al., 2006; Schulte-Ruther et al., 2007; Shamay-Tsoory and
Aharon-Peretz, 2007; Schnell et al., 2011; Bruneau et al., 2012;
Sebastian et al., 2012; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2014; Bruneau
et al., 2015) or have studied empathy and ToM in separation
(Dziobek et al., 2011), the interaction of empathy and ToM within
individuals has received only little attention (c.f. Lockwood
et al., 2013). We therefore addressed two critical questions: First,
on the level of inter-individual differences, are people who
strongly empathize with others also more proficient in ToM?
This would point toward a general capacity underlying social
understanding, analogously to the proposed g-factor in intelli-
gence research (Jensen, 1998; Garlick, 2002). Second, on the level
of the individual brain, (how) do the neural networks supporting
empathy and ToM interact during complex real-life understand-
ing of others? For example, highly emotional situations may
lead to prioritized empathic responding at the cost of accurate
mentalizing.
To address these questions, we assessed behavioral and
neural responding in a validated functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) paradigm [EmpaToM, see Figure 1 (Kanske et al.,
2015b)] that allows the manipulation of empathy and ToM dur-
ing realistically complex social understanding. Participants
view videos in which individuals of different age, gender and
race talk about autobiographic episodes. These videos can ei-
ther be emotionally negative, eliciting empathic responding, or
neutral. Participants are asked to rate their affective state after
each video. ToM performance is assessed by questions that ei-
ther require inferring the mental state of the narrator (ToM con-
dition) or physical facts (factual reasoning, control condition).
The EmpaToM was validated with existing behavioral and fMRI
paradigms and separates empathy and ToM on a behavioral
and neural level. Specifically, it elicits distinct activity in AI, dor-
somedial prefrontal/ACC and IFG for empathy (when contrast-
ing emotional vs neutral videos and when testing for activity
that is parametrically modulated by the valence ratings after
each video) and ventral TPJ and anterior and posterior midline
regions for ToM (when contrasting ToM vs non-ToM questions
or videos with ToM vs non-ToM demands) (Figure 2A; Kanske
et al., 2015b).
In the present study, this paradigm was employed to directly
investigate the interrelation of empathy and ToM on an inter-
individual level and on the level of the individual brain. To ad-
dress the question whether the proclivities to empathize and
mentalize are related on a behavioral and neural level, we first
calculated correlations of inter-individual differences in em-
pathy and ToM measures and secondly tested whether people
with high empathic responding are distributed equally across
people with high and low mentalizing capacities, and vice versa.
To investigate how the two underlying neural networks work
together on an intra-individual level during online social under-
standing, we used dynamic causal modeling (DCM) to investi-
gate how activity in regions identified to be crucial for empathic
responses and mentalizing (AI and TPJ) interacts under em-
pathy and ToM demands.
Materials and methods
Participants
One-hundred ninety-one participants were tested in the context
of a longitudinal study at baseline (ReSource study; Kanske
et al., 2015b; Singer et al., 2015)1. Thirteen participants were
excluded due to technical problems during data acquisition.
One-hundred seventy-eight participants (age mean¼ 40.9 years,
s.d.¼ 9.5, 106 female, 176 right-handed) underwent the experi-
mental procedures. All participants signed informed consent
prior to participation. The study was approved by the local eth-
ics committees of the University of Leipzig and the Humboldt
Universit€at zu Berlin.
Tasks
For details of the EmpaToM task, see Kanske et al. (2015b; Figure
1). Videos were presented which were either emotionally neu-
tral or negative and which were designed to later allow ToM or
factual reasoning questions (2  2 factorial design). In ToM vid-
eos, the narrator’s mental states (beliefs, intentions, thoughts
about someone else’s states, etc.) are not being spelled out and
have to be inferred by the participant, while the non-ToM vid-
eos are not defined by the absence of any mental or affective
states, but mental states do not have to be inferred as they are
either not relevant or they are concretely spelled out (for exam-
plary stimuli, see Supplementary data S1). After each video, par-
ticipants rated how they felt (valence rating) and how much
compassion they felt for the person in the video (compassion
rating). A subsequent multiple choice question was presented
either demanding ToM reasoning or factual reasoning on the
contents of the video. One of the three response options was al-
ways correct while the other two were incorrect. Finally, partici-
pants rated how confident they were to have chosen the correct
response. Twelve trials per condition were presented. Three
measures were of particular interest: First, empathic responding
was assessed as the difference in valence ratings after negative
minus neutral videos. Second, a further measure of empathic
responding was derived, the degree to which performance was
impaired by the emotionality of the preceding video. This meas-
ure was calculated as performance composite after emotional
minus neutral videos. Finally, ToM performance was assessed
by the composite of response time (RT) and accuracy in ToM
questions. Specifically, responses were classified as incorrect
when participants chose a wrong response option or when no
response was provided within 14 s (note that the rate for omis-
sions was very low, mean¼ 3.6%, median¼ 2.1%). As the time it
1 Please note that this study is based on the same participant sample as
described in Kanske et al. (2015b). Importantly however, all data, ana-
lyses and results described in this study are novel and have not been
described or shown elsewhere.
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takes participants to correctly respond to ToM questions may
account for additional variance in ToM proficiency levels, RTs
for correct trials were calculated. Speed and accuracy were com-
bined by calculating z-scores for both measures and taking their
unweighted mean.
Additionally, we behaviorally assessed two established
tasks: In the empathy task [Socio-affective Video Task (SoVT;
Klimecki et al., 2013)], participants are presented with silent vid-
eos depicting people in distress (high emotion) or performing
everyday activities (low emotion) and are asked to rate how
they feel (valence rating) and how they feel for the other (com-
passion rating). The empathy measure is derived by subtracting
valence ratings after highly emotional from neutral videos. The
perspective taking task [Samson Visual Perspective Taking Task
(Samson et al., 2010)] measures people’s ability to flexibly switch
between their own and another’s visuo-spatial perspective,
and, specifically, the degree to which their own egocentric per-
spective interferes when judging the other’s point of view. The
inverse egocentricity bias was taken as an indication of perspec-
tive taking ability.
Note that in the course of validating the EmpaToM task
based on the present and previous data sets [see Kanske et al.,
(2015b) for more details], we demonstrated (1) that emotional
videos elicit affective responses in subjective (valence
rating) and physiological measures, and that (2) the empathy
measure (valence ratings) was significantly related to the em-
pathy measure (valence ratings) of the SoVT while (3) the
ToM measure of the EmpaToM showed significant relations
to performance in the Imposing Memory Task (Kinderman
et al., 1998), a verbal high-level mentalizing task and the reverse
egocentricity bias in the Samson Task, a measure of ability to
overcome an egocentric bias in visual perspective taking
(Samson et al., 2010). Furthermore, (4) the empathy-related acti-
vations overlapped with activity elicited during the SoVT, tested
in the same participants, and with a meta-analysis of empathy
studies (Bzdok et al., 2012). The (5) ToM-related activation over-
lapped with activity during a false-belief task (Dodell-Feder
et al., 2011) and a meta-analysis on ToM studies (Bzdok et al.,
2012).
MRI data acquisition
Brain images were acquired on a 3T Siemens Verio scanner
(Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen), equipped with a
32-channel head coil. Structural images were acquired using
a MPRAGE T1-weighted sequence (TR¼ 2300 ms; TE¼ 2.98 ms;
TI¼ 900; flip angle¼ 9; 176 sagittal slices; matrix
size¼ 256 256; FOV¼ 256 mm; slice thickness¼ 1 mm), yield-
ing a final voxel size of 1 1 1 mm. For the functional imag-
ing, a T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence was
used (TR¼ 2000 ms; TE¼ 27 ms, flip angle¼ 90). Thirty-seven
axial slices were acquired covering the whole brain with a slice
thickness of 3 mm, in-plane resolution 3  3 mm, 1 mm inter-
slice gap, field of view¼ 210 mm; matrix size 70  70. Each run
began with three dummy volumes that were discarded from
further analysis.
Data analysis
Images were analysed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of
Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). All volumes were coregis-
tered to the SPM single-subject canonical EPI image, slice-time
corrected and realigned to the mean image volume. A high reso-
lution anatomical image of each subject was first coregistered
to the SPM single-subject canonical T1 image and then to the
average functional image. The transformation matrix obtained
by normalizing the anatomical image was then used to normal-
ize functional images to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
Fig. 1. EmpaToM trial sequence. Emotional and neutral videos with and without ToM demands are followed by valence and compassion ratings, ToM and factual rea-
soning questions, and a confidence rating (adapted from Kanske et al., 2015b).
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space. The normalized images (3 mm isotropic voxel) were spa-
tially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of full-width half-max-
imum at 8 mm. A high-pass temporal filter with cutoff of 128 s
was applied to remove low-frequency drifts from the data.
Statistical analyses were carried out using the general linear
model. Onset and duration of the four video types, their corres-
ponding questions and the rating periods were modeled. These
regressors were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic re-
sponse function. The six motion parameters were modeled as
effects of no interest. To further reduce influence of potential
noise-artifacts, we used the RobustWLS Toolbox (Diedrichsen
and Shadmehr, 2005), which down-weights images with higher
noise variance through a weighted-least-squares approach.
Contrast images for the empathy contrast (emotional vs neutral
videos), the ToM contrast during questions (ToM vs non-ToM
questions) and the ToM contrast during videos (ToM vs non-
ToM videos) were calculated by applying linear weights to the
parameter estimates and entered into one-sample t-tests for
random effects analysis.
On the second level, one-sample t-tests for the empathy and
ToM contrasts were performed. As described in (Kanske et al.,
2015b), the specifics of ToM and empathy were analysed by
entering the respective first-level contrast images [i.e. contrast
images for empathy (emotional vs neutral videos) and ToM
(ToM vs non-ToM questions)] into a one-factorial design with
dependent levels. Specifics were then assessed with t-contrasts
of ‘ToM> Empathy’ and ‘Empathy>ToM’, which were inclu-
sively masked for significant voxels of the respective simple
contrast (Figure 2A).
Resting state analysis. SPM8 and DPARSF were applied to analyse
the resting state data (Chao-Gan and Yu-Feng, 2010). After dis-
carding the first 10 volumes, all functional scans were slice-
time corrected and realigned. T1 images were coregistered to
the functional scans and a DARTEL template was created using
the averaged T1 images from all subjects. Nuisance covariates
including six head motion parameters, head motion scrubbing
regressor, white matter signal and cerebro-spinal fluid (CSF) sig-
nal were removed from the functional data. To reduce very low-
frequency drifts and high-frequency respiratory and cardiac
noise the linear trend of time courses was removed and then
temporally band-pass filtering (0.01–0.08 Hz).
To calculate functional connectivity, spheres (radius¼ 5 mm)
around the peak regions in the left AI and left TPJ [as derived
from the specific ‘Empathy>ToM’ (x¼33, y¼ 21, z ¼ 3) and
‘ToM>Empathy’ (x ¼ 48, y¼57, z¼ 24) contrasts] were
defined as seed regions. Averaged time courses were obtained
from the spherical region of interest (ROIs) and correlation ana-
lyses were performed in a voxel-wise way to generate a func-
tional connectivity map. Correlation coefficient maps were then
converted into z maps by Fisher’s r-to-z transform to improve
normality. These maps, calculated in original space were nor-
malized into MNI space, re-sampled to 3-mm isotropic voxels
and smoothed with a 4 mm FWHM kernel.
Dynamic causal modeling. Dynamic causal modeling was used to
characterize effective connectivity between left AI and left TPJ
as well as the modulatory influence of empathy and ToM on
this connectivity (Friston et al., 2003). Time-series from 5 mm
spheres around individual subject peaks in AI and TPJ were ex-
tracted. V1, defined anatomically, was included in the model as
a sensory seed region (Lu et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2014), to model
the direct influence of the stimuli onto the system (Friston et al.,
2003). Because connectivity in DCM analysis reflects functional
interactions between regions rather than anatomic connectivity
(Friston et al., 2003), the information transfer from V1 to the
other nodes of the network, can be estimated without including
further relay regions during the information transfer (Eickhoff
et al., 2009; Grefkes et al., 2010). Twenty-six participants did not
show above threshold activation in one of the regions and
analyses were run on the remaining 152 participants. DCMs
were defined with video stimulation as driving input to V1
and connections from V1 to AI only, TPJ only or both
(V1!AI,TPJ V1,TPJ V1!AI). Connections between AI and TPJ
were either unilateral or mutual (AI!TPJ,AI TPJ,AI !TPJ). We
also allowed emotion and ToM to influence all possible unilat-
eral and mutual connections of AI and TPJ, either alone or
jointly. Varying all possible combinations yielded 72 DCMs,
which were fitted for each participant. Multi-step random-ef-
fects Bayesian model selection was used to identify the optimal
model family and then compare the DCMs within this winning
family. Model families were defined based on (1) whether V1
was connected to AI, TPJ or both, (2) whether connections be-
tween AI and TPJ were unilateral or bilateral and (3) whether
emotion had an influence on any of the AI-TPJ connections or
not. In a last step, significance of all parameters was tested for
further interpretation (Stephan et al., 2010).
Results
Relating inter-individual differences in empathy
and ToM
To investigate whether strong empathizers are better mental-
izers, we tested the relation between individual differences in
these social capacities on a behavioral and neural level (Figure
2B). First of all, behavior in the EmpaToM task revealed no cor-
relation between empathizing (valence ratings) and ToM per-
formance (see Table 1 for correlations between all behavioral
measures of empathy and ToM). To generalize the observed
independence on the behavioral level, we integrated the
EmpaToM measures with the two additional empathy and ToM
tasks [SoVT (Klimecki et al., 2013), Visual perspective taking task
(Samson et al., 2010)] using principal component analysis (PCA;
for details on all PCA analyses see Supplementary data S2). This
analysis yielded two clearly distinct data-driven composites, a
factor representing empathy (valence ratings in both the
EmpaToM and the SoVT as well as performance impairments
after emotionally negative videos in the EmpaToM) and a factor
representing ToM (ToM performance in the EmpaToM and in-
verse egocentricity bias in the Samson task) (Supplementary data
S3, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin¼0.54; Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity¼ 42.4, P
<0.001; % variance explained¼ 54; see Supplementary data S4 for
PCA including errors and RTs for ToM separately). Even though
permitted in the statistical analysis (PCA with oblique rotation),
these factors were also not correlated.
We then turned to ask whether independence of empathy
and ToM also holds for the related neural activity. Subjecting all
above threshold peak activations from the EmpaToM to PCAs
yielded two composites that clearly distinguished neural activa-
tion elicited during empathy and during ToM, both when the
ToM contrast was derived during the questions and when the
ToM contrast was derived during the videos (Supplementary
data S5 and S6, KMO.84; Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 1608, P <
0.001; % variance explained 58.3). Mirroring behavioral find-
ings, factor scores were uncorrelated; hence, individual differ-
ences in neural activity during empathizing were not correlated
with differences in neural activity during ToM reasoning.
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Finally, in order to corroborate the correlational results, we
statistically tested whether people with low and high empathic
responding in behavior (based on a median split on scores on
the empathy factor) were equally distributed across people with
low and high mentalizing abilities (median split on scores on
the ToM factor). In addition, the same was done for scores on
neural activations during empathy and ToM (either when the
ToM contrast was derived during the videos or during the ques-
tions). Crucially, the absence of a relation revealed in correl-
ations was corroborated by the finding that people with high
Fig. 2. (A) Neural activity for empathy>ToM and ToM>empathy (Kanske et al., 2015b), and resting state networks seeded from AI and ventral TPJ. (B) Correlations of
empathizing (valence ratings) and ToM performance in the EmpaToM; correlations of the factor scores representing empathy and ToM across different behavioral
tasks; correlations of neural activity related to empathy (emotional>neutral videos) and ToM (ToM>non-ToM questions and ToM>non-ToM videos). (C) DCM results
depicting the winning model (significant coefficients depicted in bold); exceedance probabilities for the comparisons of model families and of models within the win-
ning family.
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empathic responding were distributed equally across people
with high and low mentalizing capacities, and vice versa, both
in behavioral and neural measures (Pearson’s Chi Square Tests
and Fishers Exact Tests: values< 2.0, Ps> 0.1).
Causal influences between empathy- and ToM-related
neural activations
To investigate how empathy and ToM are coordinated in an in-
dividual brain in the process of understanding another person,
we used DCM. DCM allows the characterization of temporal
causal influences between core brain regions and their modu-
lation by experimental conditions (Friston et al., 2003; Stephan
et al., 2007). As core regions we chose AI and TPJ peaks
observed in the EmpaToM because (1) meta-analyses identi-
fied these as the most consistently activated regions for em-
pathy and ToM (Lamm et al., 2011; Schurz et al., 2014) and
because (2) seeding from these peaks in resting state scans
corroborated their embedding in separate networks in task-
free functional connectivity (Figure 2A and Table 2). Families
of DCMs were selected stepwise. Of the 72 tested DCMs
(Stephan et al., 2007), highest probability was found for model
families with input connections from V1 to both AI and TPJ
(exceedance probability U¼ 0.733, Figure 2C), with mutual con-
nections between AI and TPJ (exceedance probability U¼ 1)
and with a modulatory influence of emotionality of the video
(exceedance probability U¼ 0.997). The winning model
(exceedance probability U¼ 0.378) showed that AI inhibited TPJ
activity, particularly in conditions of high negative emotional-
ity (t(151)¼2.3, P < 0.05). This finding suggests that the AI
down-regulates ongoing processes in TPJ when salient emo-
tional events demand prioritization.
An imminent question raised by this finding is whether
ToM performance also suffers in situations of high empathic
distress (‘empathy costs’). We therefore calculated the degree
to which individual ToM performance was impaired in emo-
tionally negative vs neutral conditions (as a measure of em-
pathy costs) in the EmpaToM task and grouped participants
accordingly. Specifically, empathy cost was calculated as the
difference between EmpaToM performance (composite score
of reaction times and error rates) in ToM questions after nega-
tive minus neutral videos. The distribution of this variable was
normal (P > 0.20; Supplementary data S7). Participants were
grouped according to a median split (median¼0.157) into
people with and people without empathy costs. We then asked
whether the down regulation of TPJ by AI in situations of emo-
tional distress would be found specifically in the group with
empathy costs. Indeed, group-specific DCM analyses repli-
cated the inhibiting influence of AI on TPJ during emotional
conditions in those individuals who showed empathy costs,
whereas no inhibition was found for individuals without
empathy costs. Specifically, when only participants with em-
pathy costs were included, highest probability was found for
model families with input connections from V1 to both AI and
TPJ (exceedance probability U¼ 0.904, Supplementary data S8),
with mutual connections between AI and TPJ (exceedance
probability U¼ 1) they with a modulatory influence of emo-
tionality of the video (exceedance probability U¼ 0.943). In the
winning model (exceedance probability U¼ 0.469), AI inhibited
TPJ activity, particularly in conditions of high negative emo-
tionality (t(75)¼3.0, P<0.01). No other coefficients were signifi-
cant (Ps > 0.20); they are therefore not interpreted (Stephan
et al., 2010). By contrast, when only participants without em-
pathy costs were included, highest probability was found for
model families with input connections from V1 to both AI and
TPJ (exceedance probability U¼ 0.898, Supplementary data S8),
with mutual connections between AI and TPJ (exceedance
probability U¼ 1), and with a modulatory influence of emo-
tionality of the video (exceedance probability U¼ 0.734). In the
winning model (exceedance probability U¼ 0.566) none of the
coefficients were significant (Ps > 0.20), including the influ-
ence of AI on TPJ in emotional situations, they can therefore
not be interpreted (Stephan et al., 2010).
Discussion
This study investigated the relation of affective and cognitive
routes to understanding others by addressing two questions:
First, are empathy and ToM linked on an inter-individual level,
that is, are strong empathizers also good mentalizers? Second,
how are the neural networks underlying empathy and ToM
working together during the online processing of social infor-
mation? Data show that inter-individual differences in behav-
ioral and neural measures of empathy and ToM were
independent. During online processing of social situations,
however, the two networks interacted; specifically, we found in-
hibitory causal influences among key nodes of the empathy-
and ToM-related neural networks and impaired mentalizing
performance in highly emotional situations.
Using different convergent methods and analyses, we
observed neither significant relationships between empathy-
and ToM-related behavioral measures (within the EmpaToM
and when including independent empathy and ToM tasks) nor
between the respective underlying neural networks. To corrob-
orate these findings, we statistically demonstrated that high
and low empathizers were equally distributed across high and
low mentalizers, and vice versa. This finding suggests that the
tendency to empathize does not contribute to and is not de-
pendent on the capacity to infer others’ mental states. Selective
impairments of empathy and ToM have been suggested in psy-
chopathology. In autism spectrum disorder, for instance, defi-
cient ToM abilities have been reliably reported (Frith, 2001;
Table 1. Correlation matrix of all individual behavioral measures of empathy and ToM
Measure SoVT vr EmpaToM vr EmpaToM ap EmpaToM ToM Samson eb
SoVT valence rating 0.36*** 0.22** 0.01 0.12
EmpaToM valence rating 0.36*** 0.15* 0.12 0.03
EmpaToM affect performance 0.22** 0.15 0.04 0.03
EmpaToM ToM performance 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.17*
Samson egocentricity bias 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.17*
Correlation coefficients are reported. *** indicates significant correlations at P<0.001 (2-tailed); **P < 0.01 (2-tailed); *P<0.05 (2-tailed).
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Schwenck et al., 2012; Kana et al., 2014), while empathy seems to
be preserved when controlling for comorbid alexithymia (Bird
et al., 2010; Bird and Viding, 2014). Psychopathy, on the other
hand, is characterized by preserved ToM, but reduced empathic
responding (Blair, 2008), at least if empathic responding is
not explicitly encouraged (Meffert et al., 2013). Also in the
neuro-typical population, autistic and psychopathic traits are
selectively correlated with reduced capacities in perspective-
taking and empathy, respectively (Lockwood et al., 2013). While
clinical studies hint at selective disruption, this study shows
that the capacities to empathize and mentalize vary independ-
ently from one another across a wide range of individuals
within a healthy population. Thus, unlike in some lines of intel-
ligence research, where a general capacity to perform well
across tasks has been proposed (Jensen, 1998; Garlick, 2002), the
socio-affective capacity of sharing feelings with another and
the socio-cognitive capacity of inferring mental states may be
independent.
However, it is interesting to note, first, that a recent study by
(Lockwood et al., 2013) did find a moderate positive correlation
between a social animations task and an affective resonance
task. As their sample was smaller, this cannot indicate that the
null-correlation in the present study is due to a lack of power.
Rather, it suggests that the specific operationalization of em-
pathy and ToM gave rise to the difference. Meta-analyses dem-
onstrate that social animations consistently activate a subset of
the regions in the full ToM network, possibly indicating that
processing social animations involves also a specific subset of
the cognitive processes that constitute ToM (Schurz et al., 2014;
Schurz and Perner, 2015). The ToM contrast in the EmpaToM
(i.e. ToM>non-ToM questions), in comparison, activates the
entire mentalizing network (Kanske et al., 2015b) suggesting
that this task requires the involvement of all computations
involved in full-blown ToM. Interestingly, social animations ac-
tivate the left insular cortex (Schurz et al., 2014) and the amyg-
dala (Martin and Weisberg, 2003) and also elicit subjective
emotional responses since they depict affective scenarios (e.g.
tricking, coaxing; Rime´ et al., 1985). Such emotional responses in
the observer may contribute to the ascription of intentionality
to the animated characters, thereby precipitating a correlation
with the affective resonance task. Furthermore, there was a
considerable age difference between the two studies [21.9 years
in Lockwood et al. (2013) and 40.9 years in this study]. Previous
research indicates that socio-cognitive skills change over the
lifespan, showing reduced ToM capacities in younger, but also
in older age (Moran, 2013). Whether the relation between socio-
cognitive and socio-affective skills is also altered over the
course of one’s lifetime (e.g. whether empathy and ToM are cor-
related in younger, but not in middle age) will need to be ad-
dressed in future research. Second, studies on self-reported
social skills also paint a different picture. Employing question-
naires such as the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983)
or the Questionnaire of Affective and Cognitive Empathy
(Reniers et al., 2011), researchers showed correlations between
participants’ tendencies to describe and/or perceive themselves
as empathic and as willing to take other people’s perspectives
(Davis, 1983; Reniers et al., 2011; Georgi et al., 2014; Lockwood
et al., 2014). A possible reason for the discrepancy may be that
people’s implicit and explicit conceptualizations of empathy
and ToM are not as distinct as researchers’ operationalizations
are, making questionnaires somewhat more susceptible to sub-
jective conceptions of these capacities, folk psychology and so-
cial desirability (Stone et al., 2000). It will be an interesting
future endeavor to elucidate the link between self-reported and
behavior-based assessments of empathy and ToM. In addition,
future studies may aim at addressing the relation between em-
pathy and ToM and further aspects of social understanding and
social interaction, ranging from compassion and prosocial mo-
tivation to the ability to negotiate with or manipulate others.
The absence of a general capacity underlying behavioral em-
pathy and ToM has implications, in particular for psychopath-
ology and plasticity research. Across different mental disorders,
deficits in social interaction have been described, for example
Table 2. Activation peaks for resting state connectivity from AI and
TPJ
MNI coordinates
H x y z T Z Cs
Resting state: AI seed > TPJ seed
AI L 33 21 3 43.18 >8.21 3132
Middle frontal gyrus L 42 45 27 14.29 >8.21
AI L 45 9 6 14.19 >8.21
TPJ–SMG L 63 24 24 11.21 >8.21
AI R 36 21 6 18.73 >8.21 3719
AI R 33 27 0 18.63 >8.21
Anterior cingulate R 6 15 45 13.24 >8.21
Anterior cingulate L 6 18 36 9.65 >8.21
TPJ–SMG R 60 27 39 12.97 >8.21 1379
TPJ–SMG R 60 27 48 12.14 >8.21
Inferior orbitofrontal R 21 36 18 9.41 >8.21 114
Frontal pole R 24 45 15 8.88 >8.21
Inferior orbitofrontal L 27 39 15 8.63 >8.21 54
Middle temporal L 54 66 3 8.07 7.72 175
Inferior temporal L 51 60 9 7.95 7.62
Inferior temporal L 45 45 15 6.76 6.55
Posterior cingulate L 15 33 42 7.48 7.2 49
Middle temporal R 57 51 6 6.73 6.52 69
Lateral occipital R 36 81 30 5.62 5.49 15
Lateral occipital R 42 72 21 5.19 5.09
Cerebellum L 21 69 51 9.77 >8.21 75
Cerebellum R 21 72 51 8.28 >8.21 33
Cerebellum L 36 48 30 6.57 6.38 40
Resting state: TPJ seed > AI seed
TPJ–angular gyrus L 48 57 24 44.62 >8.21 896
Precuneus L 3 54 30 24.96 >8.21 1376
Posterior cingulate L 9 48 33 23.33 >8.21
TPJ–angular gyrus R 54 57 27 22.22 >8.21 711
Lateral occipital R 51 63 42 15.79 >8.21
Superior frontal L 6 51 39 18.15 >8.21 3632
Superior frontal L 12 42 45 17.35 >8.21
Superior frontal L 12 30 57 15.5 >8.21
Cerebellum R 21 84 39 17.36 >8.21 670
Cerebellum L 30 81 33 17.05 >8.21 482
Middle temporal L 60 9 18 17.05 >8.21 1065
Middle temporal L 60 21 15 15.64 >8.21
Temporal pole L 45 12 36 11.99 >8.21
Middle temporal R 63 12 21 15.06 >8.21 889
Middle temporal R 66 33 3 10.57 >8.21
Temporal pole R 48 15 36 9.97 >8.21
Cerebellum R 6 51 45 14.68 >8.21 167
Inferior orbitofrontal L 45 30 12 9.14 >8.21 148
IFG L 54 24 9 8.95 >8.21
Inferior orbitofrontal R 45 33 15 6.89 6.67 24
Cerebellum L 6 51 24 6.87 6.66 23
Subcallosal cortex L 3 9 12 6.82 6.61 18
Hippocampus L 24 15 21 6.34 6.17 34
H, hemisphere; Cs, cluster size in number of voxels.
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in personality disorders and depression (Arntz et al., 2009;
Wolkenstein et al., 2011). Comprehensively characterizing socio-
affective and -cognitive deficits could help delineating specific
profiles of different disorders. From this clinical as well as from
a basic neuroscience perspective, an important question is
the malleability of social functioning. The simultaneous assess-
ment of empathy and ToM could benefit intervention studies,
for example on specific meditation practices or psychotherapy,
to differentiate plasticity in affective and cognitive social
capacities. Attempts to train social skills need to take into ac-
count that improving empathy may not necessarily enhance
mentalizing capacities, and vice versa. On a more general level,
it may proof interesting to relate specific capacities of social
cognition to other interpersonal characteristics such as proso-
cial behavior, communication or partnership satisfaction.
Interestingly, recent evidence suggests that individual differen-
ces in people’s tendency to rather engage empathy or mentaliz-
ing in complex social settings predict differences in prosocial
decision-making (Tusche et al., 2016). In a similar vein, the as-
sessment of empathy and ToM needs to also include more bal-
anced interactions with symmetrical contributions of all parties
(Schilbach et al., 2013). This would allow investigation of social
cognitive processes elicited by observing another person, but
also the processes that result from being empathized with or
understood by another (Seehausen et al., 2012).
The second goal was to investigate how the brain networks
underlying empathy and ToM work together during complex
social situations that require online understanding of others.
To characterize the interplay of the empathy- and ToM-
related networks, we used DCM, which allows investigating
the temporal causal influences between the AI as core
empathy-related region (Lamm et al., 2011) and the ventral TPJ
as critical part of the ToM-related network (Schurz et al., 2014).
Results revealed that the interaction of AI and TPJ was best
described by a model assuming mutual influence between the
two brain areas. The AI exerted inhibiting influence on the TPJ
particularly during emotional videos, suggesting that the AI
has a role in modulating ongoing processes in TPJ, such as tak-
ing others’ perspectives, reasoning about others’ mental
states or, more generally, shifting between different sources
of information (Decety and Lamm, 2007). Indeed, only in those
participants who showed a TPJ inhibition through AI activity
in emotional situations, performance in ToM questions was
hampered in the emotional condition. These results suggest
inter-individual variability in the degree to which empathiz-
ing is prioritized over mentalizing in real-life like situations
that call for both social capacities simultaneously. As the
down-regulation of TPJ can come at the cost of impaired men-
talizing, the questions is whether chronified variants may be
a precursor for mental disorders [as has been hypothesized in
borderline personality disorder (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009)].
The adaptive function of this down-regulation, on the other
hand, may be to efficiently draw attention to those aspects of
a social situation that require immediate action, such as
others’ emotions (Menon and Uddin, 2010). Of course, future
research is necessary to probe the role of other regions within
the empathy- and ToM-related neural networks in order to
draw stronger conclusions on the interplay of the two social
functions. A comprehensive understanding of the functional
significance of the present findings furthermore depends on
testing the causal role of the observed inhibition between AI
and TPJ on the specifics of subsequent behavior. On a more
general level, an interesting question will be whether inhibi-
tory relations characterize the influence of highly emotional
states on socio-cognitive functioning (Kanske et al., 2013;
Wessa et al., 2013).
Taken together, an individual’s inclination to empathize
is generally independent from her ability to understand others’
mental states. However, in real life social interactions, highly
emotional situations can lead to impaired mentalizing. Thus,
social understanding is subserved by a flexible interplay
of distinct social functions rather than monolithic social
intelligence.
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